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9.1 DECISION MAKING THEORY
Since the Second World War, public policies have been closely aligned with the devel-
opment of the welfare state and the need to address the causes and effects of economic
cycles, as well as those events that, in economic and social science circles, are classed
under the generic heading of market failures. One of the basic tasks of public decision-
makers should be to provide a solution to such questions and guarantee the stability of
the economy and society as a whole.
Public policy decision-making, viewed from the economic perspective, revolves around
two key features. Policies are grounded in an approach known as ends-means rationality.
From this approach, in the early 1950s, there gradually unfolded a theory that remained
predominant for over three decades—the public intervention theory. This methodology
first identifies the ends or objectives to be pursued and then selects the best means of
attaining them, in two separate steps. The responsibility for developing public policies
belongs to the regulator, which has always been the institution legally charged with the
task. In some cases it has fallen to the state, in others to federal or regional administrations.
To establish their ends or goals, representative democracies have customarily resorted
to a political process through which collective preferences are determined by way of a
suitable electoral procedure, in which individuals are able to express their preferences.
The results reveal the collective preferences from which the social welfare function can
then be derived. The second part of the process is to maximise social welfare using the
technical instrument best suited for the purpose, to the exclusion of any other criteria.
The outcome of this procedure is a welfare-optimising public policy that enables the
public authorities to decide on the optimum allocation of available resources. This public
intervention theory placed the regulator in the role of mere specialist intermediary between
collective wills and their technical and scientific transformation into practical public
policies.
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From a global perspective, resources are allocated by means of a mathematical opti-
mising technique or, in any event, a formal technical mechanism, in which the regulator
solves the problem by simply applying the best available calculating techniques. Whatever
the difficulties involved in the calculation process, or in the design and implementation
of the political process used to determine collective preferences, the role of the regulator,
in this scenario, is restricted to the mentioned function.
Public action was considered absolutely neutral and technocratic. Thus, its legitimacy
was always based on the fact that it was the means by which optimal policies could be
developed, using totally objective criteria, in which neutrality had to be guaranteed by
the impartiality of the procedures used in the process. The performance of policy-makers
was evaluated only in terms of their capacity to efficiently attain the goals determined
through the electoral process. Preferences were the prerogative of individuals and the
community; once their wills had been expressed through that process, the regulator, as a
specific agent, should be free of any preferences. In so far as the welfare theory largely
solved the basic problems of the optimisation programme, it was along these parameters
that it pursued a long-lasting discourse [1].
From the arguments that have been put forward about regulation and regulators, it
is easy to see that role of scientists, experts and knowledge in this model had to be to
provide the scientific and technical analyses needed to devise an optimising programme
technically suited to the preferences expressed by the collective will. From their neutral
position, their role as a part of this process should also include proposing designs for
optimal policies, which policymakers are then obliged carry out, always accepting they
are not allowed to interfere in the public decision-making process.
Historically, economics and decision theory have been firmly split between two sub-
fields or branches: positive and normative. The positive branch takes the main weight of
providing the basic analyses to explain phenomena and supply the concepts and models
needed to understand facts. The approach of the positive branch of science has been
to maintain a basically passive role with respect to facts. As such, it has not involved
itself deeply by intervening with its models in the analysis of the concrete realities that
surround us.
The normative branch, meanwhile, has essentially taken up the task of applying the
methods and models proposed by the positive branch to the melting pot of practical
problems that are raised. As such it has taken responsibility for the applied aspects
of resource science and management, preparing the best means to achieve the goals
demanded by the policymakers, while dealing with the particular complications of specific
realities. This specialisation in the practice of the two branches showed up quite sharply
during the period mentioned, and served as a basic cognitive model. This conception
of public policies provided the basis for the regulative procedures referred to in the
literature as top-down models. Indeed, as already indicated, in this model the regulator
acts as an all-powerful, providential agent who assumes responsibility for the planning
and implementing the policies.
From the simplified explanation given above, it is easy to foresee the kind of criticism
this approach was liable to receive. It is a frame of reference within which at least two
key agents in the public policy-making process were denied any opportunity to express
their preferences and, therefore, had to feature as neutral agents in policymaking.
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While complying with what public policies have calculated to be the plan needed to
maximise social welfare, the different agents in society see their position become uncertain
when some of the agents discover that some policies fail to satisfy their interests. When
this happens, findings suggest that those agents who see their aspirations unfulfilled react
strategically, and neglect the plans assigned to them by regulators. In fact, they tend to
place their own interests above or on the same level as the theoretical common goal
proposed by the regulator.
Criticism from different quarters demonstrated that the ‘conventional model’, based on
public intervention theory, suffers from an absence of any analysis of agents’ interests. As
a result, theorists have gradually introduced the idea of the importance of group action by
agents sharing common objectives when it comes to public policy-making. At the same
time, however, agents were considered as a set of indeterminate individuals with neutral
interests or as a set of individual interests interacting with a global outcome, which, in
equilibrium, neutralised their mutual influence over public policies.
Acknowledgement of the active presence of individuals, social groups or institutions
with their own objectives, separate from the collective welfare objective, as defined by
the regulator, represents a break with the idea that each should passively comply with
the optimising programme devised by the policymaker. From this context, there arose the
need to analyse the behaviour of agents and groups, all defending their own objectives
and the impact they would have on the decision-making processes. This analysis, which
enabled the recognition of the importance of different social groups and communities and
of their influence over policymakers and public decisions, was extended to include the
regulators themselves who had, until then, been seen as the essence of neutrality.
The natural extension of the notion of self-interest groups to include apparently super-
neutral agents highlighted the need to develop a more global theory of the participation
of stakeholders involved in public policies, whether these be general or sectoral. This
is particularly important in the European context, and even more so in sectors where
decision-making has been centralised in the European institutions, as is the case in the
primary sector.
9.1.1 The incorporation of participation in modelling
Successive criticisms, and the evidence that has been found to support it, have generated
new proposals to incorporate participation in the models used to explain the public policy-
making process. It is clear that an inclusive approach has prevailed among the social
agents, who have diverse interests participating in the various stages of decision-making
([2] pp. 59–77).
In some cases, and in some economic and social sectors in particular, the interplay of
audiences and participation patterns has been organised on an institutional basis and a
stable institutional organisation has been created. In other cases, developments have been
informal, with varying degrees of transparency. Regulators (from, for example, state and
regional governments and parliaments), who are formally charged with the responsibility
of adopting the decision, work alongside them. These agents also have their own interests
and act as key players in the game of pressure.
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Even the state administrative bureaucracy often ends up taking part. In principle, the
administration might be thought to play the dual roles of expert advisor on technical
aspects of decision-making and guarantor of the implementation of policy decisions.
However, despite apparently having no stake in the decision, the state administration very
often ceases to act as a non-stakeholder and, instead, uses pressure to protect its own
interests. It has also been seen to display a tendency towards competitive bias in budget
distributions.
Contemporary civil society, moreover, tends to be constituted by a proliferation of
groups organised around different objectives. These are, very often, non-profit seeking
organisations with interests linked to the various types of deficit that exist in modern
society. All are engaged in pursuing specific objectives and all use pressure to sway
public policy decision-making, sometimes to the point of mobilising their members and
supporters to wage a campaign of resistance [3].
In addition to these groups, social organisations, with a long tradition of being inter-
ested in the structures of economic and social activity, are also involved in the policy
process. These include unions, employers organisations, and various types of professional
associations. Historically, the research community has been attracted by social organisa-
tions from the primary sector—in particular farmers’ and fishermen’s associations—and
in professional bodies within the public administration, who all take an active part in
public policy design.
It is also important to bear in mind the receptive attitude that decision-makers have
developed towards these groups. They have no doubt learned both that the various agents
can serve as providers of useful and interesting information, but also that they possess an
expertise that can be properly channelled only by involving them in a participative model.
Thus, organisations drawn from civil society have gained increasing recognition as an
instrument by which the improvement of the decision-making process can be achieved
and as an important legitimating factor for decisions affecting social and political life. As
such, they have been included in the deliberation process. Thus, it is of interest to consider
their importance and establish how they can be made to fit into the public policy-making
process. This places participation at the forefront of the analyses and concerns of both
theoreticians and practitioners.
9.2 EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS, PARTICIPATION
AND KNOWLEDGE PROVISION
The dynamics of the development of the EU have resulted in a multi-tiered institutional
model in which the historical institutional structures of the Member States co-exist
and interact with those that are being created and developed within the Union. This
institutional framework has given rise to a polycentric, multi-tiered decision-making
system, which differs from the traditional state system, without actually creating a new
state or new government in the traditional sense of such terms. While the institutional
and administrative structures of the Member States, with their corresponding sub-tiers at
regional and local level, remain valid, there now also exists the European level, with its
own institutions and its own way of dealing with the relationships involved. Thus, the
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decision-making model used in the EU has given rise to a complex pattern of co-ordination
between the institutions involved and between the various vertical and horizontal tiers of
government. These changes have no doubt had a profound effect on the functions fulfilled
by the public policy-making centres at the state or regional level, which, with varying
degrees of difficulty, have managed to adapt to the new demands [4].
Thus, in the space of a few decades, a continental-scale Union is being created. This
has seriously challenged our capacity to develop and implement public policies that reach
beyond the boundaries of Member States. Through consensus-building techniques in the
complex structure that has been set up, it has been possible to construct the Union as we
now know it. It is precisely the way it is put together that has turned it into one of the
hubs of the globalisation process currently taking place world-wide.
Nevertheless, some of the problems, incoherence and uncertainty, which agents have
to face, arise precisely out of the difficulties involved in putting into practice the policies
generated by such a complex machinery. Its complexity is reflected in the problems that
have to be addressed at the various stages of policy-making, starting with their scientific
and technical conception, through the preparatory stage, the administrative work, and so
on. The inherent characteristics of the methodology employed are such that, as a result of
the difficulties involved in dealing effectively with such complexity, legitimacy issues are
raised by the public, who are often dissatisfied with a model that strikes them as distant
and complicated. Part of the knowledge base should be used to highlight the difficulties
involved in conducting a participative process within such an environment, identify
possible sources of failure and the options made available through its incorporation.
Given that the EU is not grounded on the traditional mechanisms of democracy in
operation in the Member States, it cannot rely heavily on political representation for its
legitimacy. In this respect, much of its legitimacy may stem from the effectiveness of
the public policies it develops, something which, in many sectors, is not easy to achieve.
There has been notable difficulty in achieving positive outcomes from the public policies
affecting the fishing sector, for example.
Fishing and agriculture were the first sectors in which the responsibility for public
policies was transferred from the Member States to the Union: thus, they have been
regulated at Union level from its earliest stages. The first rulings that were eventually to
make up the CFP began to be adopted in 1970. The distance created by the transfer of
power from the Member States to the European decision-making centre reinforced its top-
down dynamics and drew even more attention to the effects of the hierarchical regulation
model. In a large number of European countries, the various organised stakeholder groups
within the fishing industry, basically those of the harvesting sector, began to barricade
themselves ever more tightly into their professional and sectoral organisations at the
state level. These organisations have not managed to develop a routine of interrelation
and open intervention with the European centres for the creation and implementation of
fishing policies: particularly European Commission. As a result, the industry has never
had representatives who could influence the policies created by the Commission. Nor
have European decision-makers ever succeeded in gearing their policies to match the
interests of the key agents within the sector.
In the fishing industry, participation at European level has been very superficial.
Any exchanges that have taken place have been between privileged spokesmen, such
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as Ministers of fisheries and fishing administrations in individual Member States. And
so, the fishing industries of the individual Member States have turned to the Council
of Ministers in their search for an opportunity for talks at the European level. While
doing so, the industry has conducted a strategy of putting on the pressure once decisions
have been taken, but remaining absent from the arenas in which they are discussed and
developed.
This process has revealed the presence of a two-fold crisis. On the one hand, neither
state nor European level regulation models have, as yet, succeeded in creating the proper
channels to integrate the fishing industry’s stakeholders and to link the different levels
and centres of decision-making in a coherent manner. As a result of this failure, for a
long time, the only policies that were introduced were vertical policies, the legitimacy of
which few of their targets recognised. Fishing industry firms, meanwhile, also lacked a
sectoral structure on a European scale that would allow them to consolidate their interests
at that level of action.
All these institutional factors that enabled the persistence of the top-down structure of
fisheries management in Europe give rise to the idea that the crisis involved in finding the
right model of governance could be held largely to blame for the crisis in stocks which
European fisheries have suffered in recent decades. At the same time, the industry’s
stakeholders have stressed the need to introduce new structures that do not emanate from
governments or public administrations; and for themselves, and other stakeholders and
civil society organisations affected by the polices, to participate in fishing policy making
processes.
In the European setting, a strategy known as governance has been devised in an attempt
to ensure a new model of governability for economic sectors and society as a whole.
One of the key features of this governance model is that economic and social agents are
assigned an input, enabling them to participate to different degrees in the creation and
implementation of public policies. These governance models are characterised by the fact
that the rules of play, which are different from those that have prevailed traditionally, are
shaping new ways for the representation of both general and private interests. In the area
of knowledge-base provision, the various stakeholders are able through their participation
to bring elements to the participative process that would otherwise not be introduced into
collaborative knowledge creation processes.
9.3 DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM: MODES OF
CONSTRUCTING A COLLABORATIVE KNOWLEDGE BASE
The quality of outcomes from scientific models, and of related proposals for the regulation
of the fishing industry, depend, in part, on the quantity and quality of the available data
and models to make the knowledge system work. It is, therefore, essential to ensure that
industry actors collaborate in the process. However, their degree of involvement may
differ [5]. The different levels of participation are presented below in ascending order of
the degree and complexity of commitment. These models of collaboration are cumulative
in that each one incorporates the basic perspective of the earlier ones. The scheme is
based on Wilson [6] and was developed from collaborative research, though we use it
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here for participatory approaches to creating the management knowledge base. This is
laid out in detail in Chapter 4. In summary the four models of collaboration are.
The Deference Model: Scientists are the experts and the best way to get an accurate
picture of nature is to rely on their professional judgement. Experience-based versus
Research-based Knowledge: Scientists and fishers see the world differently because of
differences in training, experience and culture. Science can be improved by listening to
what fishers have to say about the resource. Competing Constructions: Scientists and
fishers collaborate within interest groups to create pictures of the resource that reflect
particular concerns. Community science: Collaborative fisheries science conducted in the
context of cooperative management.
9.3.1 Deference model
The notion of deference has been studied in various contexts (such as, organisational,
semantic, cognitive) and some of its connotations are common to all, while others are
found in one context and not in others [7]. In the case in hand, this notion will be
considered in the specific sense proposed by Wilson [6]. Deference, as it is understood in
the present context, therefore, refers to a specific attitude on the part of industry actors,
in particular those of the harvesting sector. It is the attitude that actors display when they
subordinate their own interpretation of activity in the fishing industry to that of third
parties. The observations made by these actors over years of activity in the industry, their
conjectures and systematisation of the knowledge acquired from experience, and their
stock of empirical learning, are all subordinated to scientific knowledge. Thus, they take
on a subsidiary role in regulatory policy-making, adopting an attitude of deference, and
allowing scientific knowledge to prevail over all other forms. They accept that scientists
and scientific data play an essential role in order to interpret reality and make the models
operative. This is what makes them comply with the demands of scientists engaged in
assessing stock dynamics or making TAC recommendations.
The industry actors in this case take the view that scientists are cognitively better
equipped than they are to generate proposals and to suggest possible solutions. Scientists’
analyses are understood to have been conceived from the universal body of scientific
knowledge and to be better adapted to regulatory demands than those based on empirical
knowledge, which is local or non-universal. It is thus accepted by fisheries actors that the
effectiveness of scientific methods and tools has been proven and is beyond doubt. Thus,
those who are properly instructed and trained in the use of such a tool are able to achieve
a fuller understanding of the facts, enabling them to develop general proposals with the
accredited potential to transform reality. As a result of this acknowledgement, fisheries
actors defer to the knowledge tools in the hands of scientists. While the industry actors
may not understand the specific procedures and may be unable to apply the techniques
involved, they trust the scientists to solve problems of both a specific and a general
nature.
Another aspect of deference is that, for collaboration to work, scientists and the
industry—often with encouragement from the public sector—need to agree on a plan of
action, which requires a framework of sustained collaboration. This has been achieved
in many instances and many countries. Thus, within the scheme of this collaborative
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knowledge mode, industry members assume the task of compiling information drawn out
of their activity, in order to satisfy the requests of scientists.
This, in synthesis, is the acknowledgement of science as a tool that fisheries actors,
without directly understanding it, nevertheless rely on. Such reliance is possible because
society has accepted that if it follows the rules of play laid down by scientists, assuming
them to have been correctly and scrupulously formulated, this tool can lead them to great
achievements. In summary, industry actors have no direct understanding of the techniques
but nevertheless defer to them.
9.3.1.1 Some examples of deference collaboration
A practical example of this model of collaboration in knowledge production is the process
of tagging. In a work about tagging of bluefin tuna (thunnus thynnus) Cort [8; 36–49]
relates bluefin-tagging experiences in Europe during 1911 and 1991 and he explains his
own campaigns between 1976 and 1991 with 5763 units tagged. He explains the excellent
collaboration he could obtain from several fishing vessels using a live bait method in the
Cantabrian Sea. This is a practice used extensively with all the species of commercial
interest. It constitutes an archetype of deferential collaboration.
In the last ten years, the collapse of the codfish has lightest off alarm bells and numerous
campaigns of cod-tagging have been undertaken. In Canada and the USA, the Regional
Northeast Cod-tagging programme was undertaken during 2003, and, recently, another
programme of tagging has been undertaken in the Baltic and North Seas. Certainly,
contemporary tagging programmes use very sophisticated mechanisms: able to measure
the depth, the salinity, the temperature of the water in which the fish swims several
times each hour. Nevertheless, the collaboration procedure remains essentially the same
as that employed in traditional tagging programmes. To relate this to industrial fisheries,
the presence of scientists on board fishing vessels is very common and there have
been a variety of experimental and research campaigns carried out on a collaborative
basis. For example, an important campaign was undertaken within the European Union
Bigeye Programme to collect by-catch information on the European tuna purse-seine
fleet. Between June 1997 and May 1999, a total of 62 observers’ trips were conducted
as a part of this project and it is considered the largest observer programme ever carried
out in the European tuna purse-seine fishery [9].
9.3.2 Experience-based knowledge (EBK)
9.3.2.1 The rationale for such a term
The term “Experience-Based-Knowledge” comes from the generalisation of a succession
of more restrictive concepts, each of which represents a different aspect of the same
idea. Thus, Traditional Ecological Knowledge, Indigenous Knowledge, Native Knowl-
edge, Fisher Knowledge, etc., each highlight different aspects of knowledge creation and
transmission. Some place an emphasis on the experience held by a community through
the activity of past generations. Others focus on the nature of the community in which
the experience has accumulated, its main cultural features and the specific values that
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distinguish it from other fishing communities, who have in turn acquired their own knowl-
edge over several generations. Others aim to illustrate the importance of the experience
acquired, not by the community, but by individual fishermen throughout their working
life. Here, issues such as the specific characteristics of women in fisheries also come into
play. Nevertheless, the point of convergence of all these concepts is that experience is
the basic element that they contribute to knowledge creation.
9.3.2.2 The difference between deference and EBK
Experience-Based-Knowledge (EBK) is a further step in the evolution towards an under-
standing of the collaboration of the fishing industry with the scientific community in the
production and use of resource users’ knowledge.
In the deference model, co-operation came from the recognition of the capacity of
science to assess the facts. It was accepted that responsibility for the preparation of
regulatory plans and methods should be grounded in scientific method. Collaboration with
the needs of science was therefore offered, under the assumption that public policies that
had been developed within scientific parameters would be both influential and effective.
Fishermen’s role in deference knowledge production was limited to providing technical
input and the data needed to develop it properly. The EBK-type collaborative strategy,
however, involves the integration of the knowledge possessed by fishermen and other
stakeholders into the scientific model. The long-lived relationship of such actors with the
environment in which they work and live provides them with close, detailed knowledge of
the key variables of various aspects of the industry, which scientists do not usually possess.
This type of knowledge is frequently related to ecological knowledge: the conditions in
which fishermen work and the way in which they coexist with the different species. Thus,
as well as providing the data needed to make the chosen models work, the aim of EBK
is also to broaden the scope of existing models. Of course, the scope of EBK does not
include proposing a model to replace the scientific one. It was never intended to do so.
It was neither conceived nor authorised for such a purpose.
9.3.2.3 The need for new contributions to the traditional scientific model
Though this type of collaboration can be extended to include stakeholders from different
sectors of the industry, its clearest and most successful manifestations have been seen
in the harvesting sector [10]. A basic issue to be borne in mind with respect to stock
assessment and stock dynamics is that they are performed by indirect means, using long-
term catch records. For this reason, scientists use catch levels as a direct input in their
models, but there are many other related data that fishermen could provide but which,
normally, no one demands. Traditionally, it has not been common practice to take into
account the knowledge of the agents who make those catches, or to ask for information
regarding, for example, the strategies used or the species involved.
Some recent failures in the regulation of major commercial fisheries have brought to
light questions about the nature of fishers’ knowledge. Meanwhile, serious threats hang
over a large number of commercially important fisheries. Both of these situations reveal
the need for further research into current methods and knowledge sources, in order to
address regulatory issues with new management tools. Failure to predict the dynamics of
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some stocks and the difficulties involved in obtaining accurate estimates of the situation
of others have led numerous analysts to change their focus. They are now beginning to
question the uncertainty and ignorance that prevails in some areas of our knowledge of
fisheries and the congruity of key aspects of our public policies. This is one of the reasons
for importance being attached to the need to incorporate other forms of knowledge into
the traditional scientific model. It has also provided one of the main motives for the switch
of attention towards the knowledge of the actors involved in the use and exploitation of
fishing resources.
One explanation for the historical persistence of this lack of awareness is that scientists
have traditionally considered such knowledge to be superfluous to the requirements of
their scientific method. It is true that the two approaches employ very different building
procedures and the disparity of their formats has for a long time led to the idea that there
is only a very loose link between them.
Indeed the fisherman’s goal is ultimately tied to the success of his economic project,
which is why his familiarity with environmental specifics and knowledge of the species
he fishes are so important to him. The keys to a good catch have a lot to do with the
fishermen’s knowledge of the habitat of the fishing grounds, the choice of species for
each time of year, the market price of each species, and the areas where they are most
likely to be caught. The fisherman weighs up his chances of catching each species or
combination of species and makes the choices he considers will bring him the most
benefit, taking account of his restrictions. This is what makes the difference between a
working team successfully conducting a project in an efficient firm and another failing
in the attempt. Scientific knowledge, meanwhile, concerns itself more with the laws and
patterns that can be drawn from the different disciplines that study fishing activities and
species. When it comes to stock dynamics, scientists are concerned, above all, with the
evolutionary patterns of fish populations, an issue in which the geographical area in which
the catches are made is relatively unimportant; or at least much less important than it is
to the fishermen.
Since the fisherman’s knowledge is based on his perceptions of the environment in
which each species lives and develops, his main concern is with getting to know specific
details of the spatial and temporal environment of each species. In fact, fishermen deal
with fishing resources on a much smaller scale than the regulator or scientist because their
relationship with those resources takes place in the playing field. Fishers’ catch strategies
are designed on the basis of the knowledge acquired through a long-run, cumulative
interaction with the different species and the different catch strategies employed. This
places them in a privileged position to learn about the characteristics most pertinent
to their work, such as the places where each species can be found in greater or lesser
abundance, its living habits, the most and least favourable ocean parameters to locate
and catch each species, and so on. This provides them with what are, basically, local and
qualitative assessments of the nature and activity of the species. There is a basic set of
tools—including radar, echo-sounders and decca—which is used to measure specifically
these variables, and the skipper keeps a log of the location of the fishing grounds and catch
sizes over the different seasons. In this respect, the mechanisms that give the resource
user his knowledge serve an essentially different purpose from those used by the scientist,
and the nature of the research made by each depends on their priority goals. In EBK,
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quantitative accuracy does not in principle need to be very high, because that is not its
chief purpose.
Fishermen’s information and knowledge builds up through empirical testing over rel-
atively long periods of time. It develops during their daily activity in the medium where
the activity takes place. Their professional activity and their increasing knowledge-base
on catches and resources form a complex unit in which individual and collective iden-
tities are developed. The scientist, meanwhile, understands knowledge production as
coming from a universe of generalisation. Scientists perform in a scenario in which they
play the role of observers, rather than actors; they are more concerned with general
rules and less with the specific behaviour of a stock in a particular place at a par-
ticular time or the details of the habit of a certain species. Their main concern is to
understand the mechanism behind the resource behaviour, from the scientific perspective
of their particular discipline. Their aim is to obtain both qualitative and quantitative
assessments [11].
Research goals also differ across the two perspectives. For the fisherman, the learning
and transmission of knowledge, and the way it is used with the species that he fishes,
is a way of introducing cognitive certainty and security into a natural and social envi-
ronment that is risky and competitive. Thus, the ideas and expectations, forged through
the information exchange, help to form a mental positioning system or cognitive map to
guide and control his performance in an uncertain and unstable environment. In this way,
knowledge and information bring some regularity and order to the uncertainty surround-
ing the fisherman’s adventure. In this respect, it can be said that the flow and exchange
of information generate predictable and regular behaviour in the fisherman. They replace
randomness and error with predictability or redundancy.
The fundamental virtue of EBK is that it can provide qualitative—and even
quantitative—data for certain key indices and components. This contrasts with the difficul-
ties of traditional regulation in aspects relating to the heterogeneity—in terms of feeding,
breeding, habitats of repose, maximum mobility—of the medium in which stocks develop.
This heterogeneity was not taken into account in the traditional scientific model, where
such differences were usually considered irrelevant to the central issue. Despite this, their
importance was illustrated by Wilson et al. [12]. Thus, in the normal course of events,
the conversion of experience-based knowledge into scientific knowledge requires proper
translation, so that the two logics can converge into operational resource management
models [13].
A major boost to the legitimacy of the integration of EBK in knowledge production
came from the recognition of this approach by the United Nations. In 2002, the UN
proposal, Agenda 21 for Sustainable Development, pointed out the need to incorporate
EBK into the core of scientific knowledge in order to further understanding of natural
systems. The proposal also drew attention to the limited capacity of the existing scien-
tific knowledge schemes of the time to evaluate natural resources. In consequence, it
announced that further progress should be made in that direction, indicating the need for
international assistance in the promotion of sustainable development. Since information
of the EBK type was considered essential for such a task, its potential as a genuine source
of knowledge became recognised at international level, and, as such, it was merged into
some conventional scientific programmes.
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9.3.2.4 Examples of EBK
In the example to illustrate the deference model, Cort [8] indicates another interesting
variant of collaboration that fishermen offered him during the tagging campaigns. Fishers
were suppliers of empirical knowledge and providers of conjecture and hypotheses related
to several aspects of tuna behaviour, such as their preferred oceanographic and environ-
mental conditions. For Cort, the information derived from tagging and the knowledge
provided by fishers and by fishermen’s professional organisations was of valuable impor-
tance to his PhD. In this work, he identified the cognitive structures of fishermen, which
have proven their validity to make predictions on different aspects of the fishing system
and to use their marine knowledge to secure the survival of their fishing operations.
A somewhat different experience was found on the Galician coast by Freire and
Garcia-Allut [13] From information provided by the artisanal Galician fishermen, Freire
and Garcia-Allut made an in depth study of the microhabitats of key species. Using
information from fishermen as a starting off point, they made an X-ray like map of
the seabed and established what species were living their and what their habitats were.
In addition, they could explain fishermen’s knowledge base and their socio-economic
adaptations and fishing strategies in those microhabitats. Freire and Garcia-Allut explain
how such expertise, which has accumulated in the community, makes it possible for
them to live from the heritage that passed on that knowledge. After this experience, they
developed a software package so they were able to apply that methodology to other case
studies.
Other interesting cases of EBK collaboration were the participation of the fishermen
and their professional associations in the election of the most suitable places to install
artificial reefs in the Cantabrian Sea during the 1990s. While, in the Mediterranean, around
the island of Menorca, and, in the Atlantic, around the island of Hierro, the election of
Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) was conducted in collaboration with fishermen and their
professional associations [10].
In some social science disciplines, it is very common to make use of extremely varied
sources. In some such studies, the proportion of oral testimonies, in relation to other
sources, and the importance attributed to them, is greater [11]. There are numerous case
studies of this nature have emerged from the fields of ethnography, anthropology and
sociology. Another study regarding fishers’ behaviour when organising work teams in
the Cantabrian artisanal fleet is based upon significant oral research [14].
9.3.3 Competing constructions
9.3.3.1 Fishing economics as a normative science
The principal objective of analysis conducted by the various scientific disciplines in
fisheries over the last fifty years has been to investigate the causes of over-fishing crises.
During this time, the different areas of fisheries science have been engaged in trying to
provide applied regulatory methods and public policy proposals to deal with the problem
of over-fishing. Among all these applications of science to the regulation issue, however,
one model has proved extraordinarily successful. This is the bio-economic model, which,
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throughout the whole of this period, has displayed a clear normative perspective. The
basic aim of this model has been directed specifically at regulation problems [15].
One of the most important points made in the conclusions drawn from the bio-economic
model is that over-harvested fisheries (known as ‘free access fisheries’) result in an
automatic resource revenue loss and, that, in such open access fisheries, the productive
capacity of many fisheries, sooner or later, exceeds their reproductive capacity. A large
number of public policy instruments have been devised to deal with the over-fishing
problem and to correct this revenue loss.
During this period, the scientific approach towards fishery management problems has
become increasingly inter-disciplinary. Fishery management was, first, approached as a
biological issue; and the economic perspective was added later. Used in conjunction,
these two approaches have given rise to the bio-economic model, upon which public
policy has been largely based in recent years. This bio-economic model has gained
outstanding relevance, moreover, because it gave birth to a specific discipline within
fishery regulation. This model has enabled us to link biological concepts, such as the
natural mortality rate, fishing mortality rate, birth and growth rates of species, expressed
in quantitative terms as weights, with concepts such as revenue from catches, fishing
effort costs and economic returns from the resource, expressed in monetary terms.
The mathematical expression of this model and its subsequent extensions have enabled
advances in the two disciplines to be linked together in a common formal language.
This has provided a good means by which to capture the sense of problems and to meet
demands raised by regulators, while developing a pool of knowledge from which a specific
framework has evolved. The advantage of this procedure is that it has provided a common
quantitative and qualitative language for public policy. For over three decades, the bio-
economic model has been the dominant paradigm in the realm of fishery regulation. Since
its first conception, and throughout its subsequent development, it has been permanently
available for the regulation and planning of fisheries. Thus, its orientation has been
manifestly normative and applied; and it has been the regulator’s instrument of choice.
Thanks to its availability and capacity to provide solutions based on precise quantitative
and qualitative proposals, its legitimacy has been fully recognised throughout the whole of
the fishing industry. The recommendations derived from this perspective usually provide
a clear and relatively concise mandate, which allows the regulator to make public policy
proposals and to reach clear decisions. In this sense, it is also highly appreciated by
the regulator, whose decisions tend to be aimed at limiting fishing effort and sustaining
resource revenue.
It is worth stressing the interdisciplinary approach and the symbiosis of disciplines
involved in the bio-economic model. The importance of this for the scientific context and
the regulatory scene is, without doubt, comparable, disciplinary differences notwithstand-
ing, to that of biochemistry, for example. It has additional value, moreover, in that it serves
as a example for more extended symbioses currently being tested in other disciplinary
areas of fisheries science. Much energy is being devoted to developing this interdisci-
plinary approach and the isomorphism of the bio-economic model is being extended to
new fields and disciplines and further developments within the original bio-economic
model.
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Another aspect to the fisheries management problem, meanwhile, is that, due to its
initial characteristics, the bio-economic model has resulted in a top-down centralised way
of managing fisheries, similar to that critically analysed in the first section of this study.
They reveal the same methodology in the way that several important agents were lacking
in the decision-making process. The successive incorporation of participants with their
competing interests and their competing constructions has developed a more inclusive
approach to policy-making.
The customary regulation models of the past—which were designed for barely indus-
trialised fisheries—often dated from far back in history and were based on decentralised
resource allocation mechanisms. Such models functioned as self-management regimes
and the principal stakeholders in the sector were usually involved in the running of them.
These regulatory models began to break down, however, as the fisheries became increas-
ingly industrialised and pressure on resources led to general overexploitation [16]. At the
same time, bio-economic models gradually replaced the traditional type, and, after a long
period during which this last methodology has sustained the centralised type of regulation,
new bottom-up competing perspectives have emerged in fisheries policy making.
9.3.3.2 Participation with competing constructions
When the views of the interested parties are introduced into the problem-solving process,
significant changes take place in the scientific formulation of the issues. In addition to the
issues raised by scientists with respect to reality and the questions posed by the regulators,
it became necessary, in the new set-up, to address those brought up by individuals, interest
groups, or others affected by the decisions. In other words, attention had to be given to
the issues perceived from the stakeholder perspective. In this new scenario, participation
became even more important, both in the decision-making process and in the preparation
of the scientific research agenda by stakeholders. In this model, the boundaries between
scientific output and management are not as strict as in the bio-economic model and there
is a growing need to construct a framework in which the different scientific disciplines
can collaborate in seeking the answers to the questions that arise.
Thus, the participation of stakeholders has led to a formula in which the means
for generating regulatory proposals have become enormously complex and the classic
biology-economics twofold method has been invaded by new disciplines. At the same
time, this development has led to a significant opening up of the regulatory framework
where, formerly, only the harvesting sector, professional fishermen and the state regulatory
bodies were privileged to speak. A great variety of stakeholders have joined in the public
policy-making process, which now includes processors, wholesalers, recreational fishers,
and representatives of civil society such as environmentalist groups. All of these have
incorporated their own interests and values into the collaborative agreement on public
policy design, with the result that the scientist’s role is no longer reduced to preparing
what Pellizzoni [17] has coined as “the best argument”. Very often, participants take up
conflicting, as opposed to simply competitive, positions. It is rare for stakeholders to
put forward their own assessments of certain strategic variables to address the regulatory
problem, with proposals to collaborate in stock assessment for example, or even possibly
in setting TAC levels and deciding on quotas.
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Scientists will be required to devise alternative scenarios to allow for the diversity of
positions that now converge in the public policy-making process. It will, therefore, be
necessary to establish a basis of collaboration for all the stakeholders, both in knowledge
production and in certain stages of the decision-making process.
Through the range of collaboration models, from the deference model, through EBK and
particularly in the competing construction model, participation has become increasingly
inclusive. It now does not only feature demands of those directly involved in the industry;
it is being extended to include all those affected by decisions, who, in turn, are contributing
their own demands. As a result, we are now beginning to see demands from consumers,
environmentalists, and defenders of gender equality, for example, with the result that, as
participation is becoming more extensive and inclusive, the public policy-making process
is adopting a bottom-up approach that will inevitably make it more complex. In this
respect, the competing construction model includes and envelops both the deference model
and the EBK model, while also inviting the collaboration of all industry stakeholders in
the creation of new knowledge.
The significance of this change in the field of fisheries science is that, under the
new participation proposals, the actual fishing stakeholder finds a way to collaborate
in scientific production, while also sharing in making decisions, which replace those
imposed by the centralised mechanisms of the past. This enables us to recapture, from a
different angle, the link between the debates over collaborative rule-making on the one
hand and co-management on the other, both of which, in theory as well as in practice,
share the common component of participation in decision-making.
9.3.3.3 Examples of competing construction
There are several cases of competing constructions related to Icelandic Individual Trans-
ferable Quota (ITQ) management during the last decade (see, for example, [18]); and there
is also a recent case of competing construction derived from a collapse in the anchovy
fishery in the Biscay Gulf [19]. An interesting case of competing construction taking
account of particular discourses has arrived with the adoption of a moratorium on the
Atlantic tuna fishery by the European purse seine fleet. The moratorium has been adopted
specifically in the area of the Gulf of Guinea. The generalised use of Fish Aggregating
Device (FAD) by the purse seine fleet, along with the intensification of captures with
longlines, had signalled probable over-harvesting in some species. This has been of par-
ticular importance in the youngest cohorts. The portable FAD is a mechanism that works
like an attractor for tuna in the ocean and it constitutes a very effective fishery technique,
the use of which was not restricted either inside or outside the 200 miles EEZ. During its
intensive utilisation by the European industrial purse seine fleet since beginning of the
1990s, it demonstrated a particular capacity for the capture of juveniles.
However, in 1997, the European purse-seine fleet, through its producers’ organisations
(POs), decided to establish a voluntary moratorium, which was implemented and enforced
by themselves. This moratorium was in force for three months, between November of
1997 and February of 1998. The other fleets fishing in the same area did not agree to
this decision. The following year, the PO proposed to repeat the restriction on the use of
FAD and they invited the other fleets to join in with the moratorium, but did not have
any success.
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Thus, a typical competing-construction debate began. However, there was not an
adequate forum of discussion within which to develop the debate and the International
Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) do not have the authority
to compel all fishers to comply with the moratorium. This was despite the fact that,
by the following fishing year—when the same fleet proposed to maintain the existing
moratorium in the Atlantic in the same terms as the two preceding years and to take a
new decision to extend it to the Indian Ocean for a duration of two months—ICCAT
produced positive results of the impact of the moratorium, particularly with respect to
juvenile cohorts and decided to support seriously the measure.
Subsequently, the EU adopted specific legislation to support the moratorium: EC reg-
ulation 973/2001 compels the European purse-seine fleet to comply with the moratorium.
However, this regulation does not have sovereignty over non-European fleets, and, thus,
this international organisation cannot force affiliated countries to fulfil the terms of the
moratorium.
In this case, analysis made by one sector of the harvesting industry has led to a vol-
untary reduction in captures of juvenile tuna. Other interests in the same fisheries have
not agreed with that analysis and have continued fishing. ICCAT have acknowledged
the measure, but they have not convinced other fishing stakeholders join their organisa-
tion or to comply with this particular regulation. Thus, discourse on this issue remains
twofold.
ICCAT recommends the moratorium to its partners. The discourse of the European
tuna fleet was constructed, apparently, on a resource preservation basis, and it was a
decision taken by a significant element of the private sector on a voluntary basis. This
discourse had connections with the philosophical line of ICCAT and other international
organisations and councils. Nevertheless, the longline and native coastal fleets did not
adopt the moratorium plan. Native coastal fishers argued that European purse seine
initiatives have a primarily commercial intent and that their fleet does not hold becoming
involved in the sound management of resources as its principal objective. Native fishers
remark that, due to an excess in the supply of tuna (particularly yellowfin, skipjacks and
bigeye), international prices of these species have been declining since 1999. To avoid
losing money and to reach a convenient market adjustment, the challenge for European
fleets has been to stop the race fish by, at times, stopping fishing. Coastal fishers argue
that the moratorium, on the European fleet, was necessitated by the high level of captures
made in relative and absolute terms, over a period of many years. They attribute the
saturation of supply in tuna markets to the European fleet and, in the same way, they
were also in agreement with the introduction of a long-term severe regulation for FAD.
Thus, during the moratorium period, coastal purse seine and bait-boats have increased
their captures, arguing that there is a need to develop the domestic tuna fishery in under-
developed countries. They support the moratorium for Europeans and suggest the period
of moratorium should transferred to increase its effective and restrict the captures of the
European fleet even further.
Longliners target older cohorts of tuna species. This kind of tuna have a special market
position with sushi-like products, and they have been defending their capture-selectivity
discourse. Basically, according to ICCAT data on captures, they have been very active
in catches, but less sharply exposed to competing discourse in this debate.
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9.3.4 Science as community
Behind the term “competing construction” lies a twofold discourse. Stakeholders are
thought, on the one hand, to have interests to defend, and, on the other, to have specific
expertise to offer; expertise that is very difficult to obtain by other means. From the point
of view of contrasting interests, each has his own perspectives and some of his constructs
will compete with those of the rest. At the same time, however, their knowledge of reality
enables them to make a potentially very valuable contribution to the knowledge pool. In
this context, therefore, it is not hard to appreciate that there are both management-related
issues and expertise-related issues at stake [20].
The competing constructs created by the different stakeholders may follow increas-
ingly separate trajectories, leading them into divergent dynamics and eventually to a
scenario of conflicting constructions. These dynamics find the scene ready-prepared, with
stakeholders from strongly contrasting cultural backgrounds and economic circumstances,
non-convergent expectations and an asymmetrical power structure [21]. In conditions
such as these, collaboration between scientists and stakeholders will, of course, be of
a very elementary nature and the result of the divergence will be seen in poor stock
condition.
The whole group of stakeholders may, on the other hand, eventually become aware of
the common objectives they share. If so, even while each stakeholder maintains his own
position and interests, the community may collectively perceive that areas of agreement do
exist. In so far as this is possible, they will see co-operation as a solution that benefits the
whole community. It is understood, therefore, that the community as a whole has reached
a level of understanding with respect to the need to collaborate to achieve their shared
objectives. This situation can accommodate a convergent dynamic between management
needs and stakeholder demands, through the pursuit of common goals.
In this scenario, in addition to being affected by regulations, stakeholders also acquire
an interest in joining in cooperative tasks. Thus, the stage has been reached in which the
whole set of actors has understood that healthy fisheries need to be properly regulated.
Stakeholders and scientists alike find the right conditions in which to develop a favourable
co-operative dynamic, both in the management arena and that of scientific and technical
production. This effectively implies a high level of stakeholder participation in both
of these areas. Starting with the competing constructs of the stakeholders, it is worth
stressing the collaborative aspect of scientific production, because it is a subject that
has not received the same attention in the academic literature as in the research on
co-management in business and decision-making.
In this respect, participation is acquiring increasing relevance, because its influence is
being transferred both to the decision-making process and to collaboration of stakeholders
with scientists and the joint preparation of the scientific research agenda. At the same time,
it is becoming easier to establish a framework in which different scientific disciplines
can collaborate in order to pool the expertise they have to offer and incorporate it into
of the process of solving management problems, and, possibly, into the general flow of
scientific knowledge [22].
From the point of view of the evolution of the collaboration between the two
worlds, such stakeholder-science collaboration is the most worthwhile and most ambitious
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scenario for co-operative understanding between the two. It draws from the deference
model by accepting that scientists are a necessary tool for a proper analysis of reality,
and it tries to integrate the knowledge of the agents in the solution of the scientific and
management problems that arise. It also proposes a departure from past histories and
competing interests and a switch towards convergent collaboration and the construction
of a solid framework for proper resource management.
The fishing community is, without doubt, the fundamental link in the chain. It has the
basic characteristics needed to drive this collaboration, because it is a social setting with
a shared culture, a close understanding of the goals that can be achieved and a suitable
framework to put into practice the agreements that are reached.
9.3.4.1 Examples of community science
In a report developed in the context of collaborative research in fishing industry in the
USA, Canada and Europe there is a discussion concerning the intervention of stakeholders
in collaborative research in the North Sea [23] The report offers an overview of ongoing
collaboration between scientists and stakeholders in several countries of Northern Europe
and, subsequently, analyses two Danish experiences. These experiences can be charac-
terised as being close to the community science that we have analysed in this section.
The author proposes that these two experiences are like experiments that could be fitted
within the community science discourse, and that could be disseminated to advantage. The
actual situation is the result of a collaborative dynamic way of developing participation
between the stakeholders in the industry. The first project was the ‘Kattegat Sole Project
2004’; and, the second, the ‘North Sea Sandeel Project 1995–2005’. These projects fea-
ture a close relationship between the fishermen, scientists and regulators. The projects
are, in fact, integrated plans, where collaborations are taking place at different levels and
regarding different aspects, beginning with knowledge production and continuing with
management and regulative aspects. Fishers take part in a collaborative way in the TAC
assessment, they are involved in by-catch evaluation, and they collaborate by completing
electronic log-books As Pauksztat [23] argues in relation these projects:
Collaborative research in Denmark seems to be part of a new alignment of the actors involved
in fisheries management. Instead of facing each other as potential opponents, fishermen and
biologists are increasingly perceived as working together as parties towards the common
goal of providing accurate stock assessments and realistic biological advice.
9.4 REGIONAL ADVISORY COUNCILS
9.4.1 Regional Advisory Councils and Participation
Earlier in this chapter we described how participation became incorporated into the models
of decision-making. However, the practical results of the theoretical recognition of the
importance of participation were, in the area of EU fisheries policy-making relatively
limited—consisting of the Advisory Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture (ACFA)—
until Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) recently claimed their place in the system.
Participation 257
The usefulness of RACs is not primarily related to providing the Commission with
information on different stakeholders’ positions, although this is also an objective [24],
but rather to providing the Commission with advice/opinions, which have already been
negotiated from the different positions of stakeholder groups. Even though it is possible to
submit majority and minority reports as advice, there is little doubt that consensus-advice
will be most influential within the CFP decision-making process. The Commission (and
other recipients) will likely be receptive to any proposal coming out of the RACs; but
definitely most receptive to advice with broad backing from within the RACs. Consensus-
advice has the backing of all the involved stakeholder groups and all groups should ideally
feel ownership over measures resulting from this advice. In this sense, the RACs need to
arrive at a compromise, like any other decision-making body within Europe.
It should be emphasised that RACs have not been given any decision-making powers.
The Commission argued that such a move would not be compatible with the primary
legal foundations of the CFP, under the terms of the Treaties of the EU. However, as
the following quotation from a high-ranking official in DG Fisheries indicates, there has
also been some concern expressed at the European level regarding how RACs would
‘behave’, which might have led the Commission to take the cautious road:
We certainly have no plan, and I do not legally speaking think we can have a plan, to make
these bodies decide anything. I think that their influence could be very great if there is a real
discussion in these organisations and a real negotiation and moving away from the sort of
primitive defence of short-term interest by everybody. Then I think that the recommendations
made from the advisory councils    It would be difficult for the Commission to move
significantly away from those. So there may be some quasi-automatic process whereby, even
though a proposal has to come through the Commission and go through the Council and the
Parliament, we would not normally change what is coming from these advisory councils.
If on the other hand they are dominated by fishing interests and purely defend minimum
change from the status quo then obviously there will be a problem.
(Interview with high-ranking DG Fisheries official, November 2003, Brussels)
It would clearly be worthwhile to look more closely into why and how the RACs
obtained the powers that they did. Equally, it would be interesting to look at how the
of RACs, as institutions, fit into broader EU developments regarding governance and
decision-making procedures. This will, however, not be the focus here.
Alongside the issue of their potential powers, another key problem to be addressed in
the preparatory phase leading to the establishment of RACs was to determine what scale
the term regional should refer to. It is important to note that fishermen deal with the
resources on a smaller scale than the regulators, and also that centralised management,
taking the whole of the Union as one macro-unit, has not proven effective and is unlikely
to do so in the future. The outcome of this discussion was five geographically defined
RACs, together covering all EU waters (the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the North
Sea, north-western waters, and south-western waters), However, it was also recognised
that some fisheries did not fit in to this geographically based scheme and so two regional
councils, defined by their type of fishery or species, were also set up: these being for
pelagic stocks and for the high seas/long distance fleet [25]. The RACs add complexity
to the polycentric, multi-tiered decision-making system, which has developed within the
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Union, by introducing a new layer to the system: a level at a larger scale than the Member
State, which is recognised as being too low a scale for management of shared stocks; and
lower than the EU level, which is at too great a scale to efficiently take into consideration
all the different aspects of fisheries in different areas.
In order to obtain legal status, full recognition, and the right to financial and technical
support, RACs must adhere to the rules laid down by the Union. RACs are, for practical
reasons, limited in their membership, albeit still attempting to guarantee the inclusion
of representatives of all the interest groups affected by the CFP. These representatives
include those from groups that are directly affected by fisheries decisions—the fisheries
sector, which includes the catching sub-sector, shipowners, wholesalers, processors, and
women’s groups. These fisheries interests were allotted two thirds of the seats in each
RAC. Second, RACs also include representatives of other interest groups affected by the
CFP. These are members of society who have an interest in fisheries management but
who are outside fisheries interests. These include environmental protection groups and
organisations, consumers, and representatives of aquacultural interests and recreational
fishermen. Such groups were allotted one third of the seats on the RACs [25].
The EU’s requirement of not discriminating between Member States or stakeholders
has meant that inclusiveness has had to be taken very literally: in principle the Greek
industry can participate in the Baltic RAC despite no de facto interest in the area. The
broad range of stakeholder groups mentioned in the regulation means, also, that there are
seats reserved for interest groups who have found it more difficult to send representatives.
This has been the case for aquaculture representatives and consumer organisations during
the first operational year of the North Sea RAC [26]. Nor are the lines between the two
overall stakeholder segments intuitively logical. Anglers and the angling industry could
just as well have been put in the industry group, since they are extractive users; and
the women’s groups might fit better among the other interest groups, which is actually
where the North Sea Women’s Network has ended up on their own request. The anglers
opposed this move because, in their view, an industry group is now occupying a seat
allotted to other interest groups [26]. In general the grouping of stakeholders into two
groups seems technocratic and divisive, and the inclusion of a variety of interests in the
group of ‘other interests’ may serve to dilute the voice of the environmental NGOs, who
are perceived as the main opposition to the industry, particularly with respect to desired
fishing mortality rates.
9.4.2 The knowledge base of the Regional Advisory Councils
From a model of ‘competing constructions’, which we described in theoretical terms
earlier, the stakeholders in the RACs will have to move towards a community model and
find areas of agreement in the pursuit of properly regulated, healthy fisheries—which is
their common goal. Formal scientific knowledge, as well as knowledge in the broader
sense, will be very significant in this process. The RACs will advise the Commission
on a broad and broadening range of issues and, for this purpose, they are in need of
knowledge to act as a lubricant for compromise. In the negotiations over proposals for
new management strategies, disputes will often arise over factual issues. This can often be
mediated by the input of relevant knowledge, which stakeholders can agree on accepting.
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9.4.2.1 Funding and the Limited Pool of Expertise
The RACs have not been supplied with a budget to commission or carry out research
of their own. If a RAC wishes to have a study carried out it will have to find external
funding for it. This can be done by applying for public funding in the concerned Member
States or funding from member organisations. Another way to get the project carried out
could be by submitting an expression of interest in the context of the EU’s Research
Framework Programmes or other more indirect approaches. The Member States involved
in each RAC oblige themselves to provide support to the functioning of the RAC [25].
However, there is no explanation as to what “appropriate support”, which is the wording
in the Council [25] regulation, means. It is not likely that Member States will be eager
to increase the overall amount spent on managing a sector of decreasing importance. An
example of how Member State support could work in practice is the Key Fishing Areas
Study.
The proposal for the Key Fishing Areas Study was formulated by the North Sea
RAC’s Spatial Planning Working Group during 2004 and 2005. The pilot study aims at
mapping key fishing areas in relation to both effort and sensitivity (for example, nursery
grounds). Although funding for the entire study remains a problem, RAC stakeholders
are expected to receive financial support from the British Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) to conduct a scoping study. This is because DEFRA
has set aside an allocation within its science budget to assist the work of RACs. DEFRA,
which is a government department with a conservation mandate, recognised, through
their participation in the working group meeting, that fish and fisheries risked becoming
squeezed by better organised interest groups from other sectors: for example, offshore
wind farming. DEFRA, therefore, saw an interest of its own in the study. Important aims
of the scoping study are going to be to identify and consider potential sources of funding
for the full study as well as making a full project application [27].
The RACs will receive transitional financial support from the EU for their first five
years. In the first year the maximum support for a RAC will be 200,000 E (a maximum
90% of the overall operating costs). This figure will decrease to maximum 110,000 E
in the fifth year (a maximum 50% of the overall operating costs). In addition, the EU
will provide up to 50,000 E each year, with no time limits, to support translation and
interpretation (Council, 2004). In relation to the knowledge base of the RACs EU funding
only covers “travel and accommodation expenses of experts attending RAC meetings”
([25] Annex II, Part 1). The financial statement for the first half of 2005 for the North Sea
RAC shows that, of the total funding of 141,300 E only 16,300 E came from membership
fees; and a mere 6000 E was spent on scientific consultants in this period [26, 28]. This
indicates that the operating budget will only contribute to a very limited degree to the
knowledge base.
The limited funding available for developing their knowledge base puts the RACs in
an analogous position with that of DG Fisheries/the Commission itself, which also has
a very limited scientific capacity of its own, and largely has to rely on goodwill from
the Member States’ national fisheries institutes to provide manpower and support for its
Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) [24], as well as
indirectly with respect to the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES).
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The RACs are, in this sense, going to compete with the Commission (and to some extent
also ICES) for the goodwill of Member States and their national fisheries institutes.
Besides the funding problem, there is also the fact that the pool of fisheries expertise
is limited. One participant at a meeting of the ICES/NSCFP Study Group on the Incorpo-
ration of Additional Information from the Fishing Industry into Fish Stock Assessments
(SGFI) in March 2005 reflected over this issue in a discussion:
The RAC must address [  ] how scientists can be able to participate in this, there is a great
demand on scientific staff, if the RAC wants advice it increases the work load and it will
involve three different bodies [STECF, ICES, RACS] giving differing advice on the same
issue.
(Observer notes, meeting of SGFI, March 2005, Stavanger, Norway)
In relation to competition for resources, the Commission has already stated its fear
that fisheries advisory activities risk being given a lower priority within ICES because
the national fisheries laboratories prioritise other work [24]. This effectively means that
RACs, if successful in attracting the necessary funding from external sources or members,
risk withdrawing scientists from other tasks. However, if the added value of the studies
formulated by RACs proves important—more ‘value for money’—then this might not
be a problem in the longer term. Nevertheless, it does constitute a potential short-term
conflict over limited resources. The conclusion of this discussion are dependent on the
RACs obtaining their knowledge base by ‘conventional’ means through the market. An
alternative is the suggestion put forward at an SGFI meeting to create a network of
“Friends of the RACs”, which would be willing to provide information to the RACs and
their working groups in an informal way (Observer notes, meeting of SGFI, March 2005,
Stavanger, Norway). This would put less pressure on the RACs and, perhaps, also place
them less in direct competition with other actors. It is, however, doubtful that larger scale
studies could be carried out in this informal way.
9.4.2.2 Providing Alternative Science and Incorporating Fishers’ Knowledge
If the RACs manage to promote their own research agenda to support their knowledge
base, it seems likely that they will promote an agenda where fishermen’s (and other
stakeholders’) knowledge has significant weight. However, it is going to be up to the
RACs themselves to decide if they should bring forth alternative science, and not merely
function as a voice for stakeholder opinions reacting to Commission proposals. The
Commission has suggested that the RACs be used for “consultation between scientists
and the fishing industry” (section 5.1 [24]), something that seems to be more related
to exchanging viewpoints than actually conducting science. Such an approach does not
really seem to constitute a move towards ‘community science’ in the sense we have
discussed earlier in this chapter. In the same context, the Commission also stated that the
RACs will be important sources of information from stakeholders. A participant at the
SGFI meeting in March 2005 commented on these ideas from the Commission:
The regulation says very little about the role of scientists, but we have written in that
scientists will be invited to participate as experts. They can come from member states, ICES
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or elsewhere, but the RAC will have to pay for its own funds. The Commission seems to
think that the RACs are there to give stakeholder views instead of giving alternative ideas,
but the RAC wants to give alternative scientific views as well.
(Observer notes, meeting of SGFI, March 2005, Stavanger, Norway, underlined)
This indicates that the RACs will have to do some work to establish a position where it
is natural that they advance their own scientific agenda. However, based on the (limited)
experience so far, it seems likely that the RACs are determined to do just that. At the
moment, at least three proposals for scientific studies, including the Key Fishing Areas
Study, have been or are in the process of being developed within the remits of sub-groups
under the North Sea RAC [26, 28].
It is explicitly stated in the proposal for the Key Fishing Areas Study that fishers’
knowledge should be taken on board as a potentially very valuable source of information
on issues such as “the distribution of fish, their movements in space and time, spawning
sites, nursery areas as well as information on fishing activities”. Moreover it is stated
that the collection of “fishers’ knowledge is a specialised task, and is not simply a matter
of asking questions from a scientific perspective. Much of the information may not fit
scientific paradigms” [27]. Much emphasis is, consequently, placed on incorporating
fishers’ knowledge.
9.4.2.3 Areas of Interest and Conflicts between Stakeholders in the RACs
In this section we will take a brief look at a few of the issues that can be expected to be
of particular interest to stakeholders participating in the RACs. The required knowledge
base of the RACs will clearly depend on the priorities of the involved interests, as RACs
are mandated to be pro-active and bring issues up of their own accord. However, much of
the essential knowledge base of the RACs will of course depend on the issues presented
to them. Nevertheless, RACs are likely to have particular hobbyhorses and angles on the
different issues.
Furthermore, RACs will, as mentioned above, be most influential on issues where
they can come to consensus-decisions. This will clearly not always be easy: lines of
conflict will often be between the ‘industry-group’ and the ‘others-group’; in other cases
lines of division will also be between industry representatives from different segments or
countries. These conflicts are also bound to influence the nature of the knowledge base
and how it will be utilised. The following sections draw heavily on Wilson [29].
One of the issues attracting the interest of stakeholders in the RACs is the various
kinds of MPAs. The North Sea RAC has already set up a working group to deal with
spatial planning, under whose remit MPAs fall. MPAs will be one of the main areas
for dispute between stakeholders in the coming years, as the perspectives of the industry
and the environmental groups differ. Whereas more or less permanently closed areas are
popular among environmental NGOs, these find little sympathy among industry-interests,
which instead prefer seasonal closures—aimed at, for example, the protection of spawning
stocks—or real-time management—where areas are closed when there is, for instance,
too high a by-catch of juveniles, and then opened again when the situation changes.
RACs will consequently need knowledge of the effects of various types of MPAs. An
important question is whether permanently closed areas are valuable in conserving fish
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stocks, which can later be utilised; or rather have only values from the perspective of
conserving biodiversity in the marine environment. Information on factors such as bottom
type, currents and migrations may facilitate the difficult compromises on issues relating
to MPAs. However, it should also be noted that the field of spatial planning and MPAs
is an area where the industry and the environmental groups can join forces against other
sectors, which want to use the sea or seabed for purposes other than fishing, with likely
negative effects for fish, fisheries and the environment: for example, the oil industry and
wind farming. The proposed Key Fishing Areas Study is a good example of this. All the
stakeholders in the North Sea RAC, as well as DEFRA, have an interest in protecting
fish stocks and breeding grounds from the damaging activities of other sectors. Although
there are conflicting perspectives among stakeholders on spatial management measures,
in practice it has been possible to arrive at the consensus that the knowledge base is
incomplete and that this can have negative effects on the position of fish and fisheries
activities vis-à-vis the claims of other sectors [27]. It is, thus, both an area of alignment
and tension between the different stakeholders.
A cross-cutting issue, which attracts the interests of RACs, is the socio-economic
aspects of fisheries management, which is particularly interesting for the industry. This
is also going to be an issue in relation to the possible development of MPAs. The North
Sea RAC has, as in the case of spatial planning, set up a working group to deal with
socio-economic issues. Knowledge about socio-economic considerations is repeatedly
mentioned as under-prioritised in fisheries management—ICES deals only with biological
and technical aspects of fisheries management—and it is, therefore, highly likely that the
RACs will try to balance this by focussing more on socio-economics. Socio-economics
is also of particular interest to angling-interests, who believe that the socio-economic
value of angling in Europe is underestimated. Angling and angling-interests are going to
become increasingly importance in the coming years and their active role in the RACs
constitutes the first time they have been formally recognised in relation to EU fisheries
management.
Finally, technical measures, relating to fishing gear and techniques, constitute an area
where the RACs will increasingly contribute and be in need of knowledge. This is an area
where scientists conducting a closer relationship with those actually carrying out fishing
will be very useful—as has been the case in many cooperative research programmes.
The large variety of gears and possible modifications also makes this area particularly
appropriate in negotiations where one must arrive at a compromise to become influential.
Wilson [29] presents an example of conflicts and conflict-resolution with the intervention
of knowledge in the North Sea RAC, which has recently been drafting a multi-annual
plan for North Sea plaice. The main part of the plan involved effort reductions through
decommissioning and days-at-sea. The impact of 80 mm mesh sizes on certain sub-stocks
in certain areas, however, was a sticking point with the industry from just one country,
and with the conservationists because of discards. This point was critical and was resolved
only when promises were made of further research with respect to mesh sizes and discards
in these areas.
The areas discussed above do not, of course, constitute an exhaustive list those issues
of interest and relevance to stakeholders in the RACs. Inevitably, the agenda of these
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new regional organisations will be driven not only by the stakeholders themselves but, to
a large extent, by the requests of the Commission or concerned Member States.
9.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The traditional view of public intervention theory placed the regulator in the role of a
mere specialist intermediary between collective wills and their technical and scientific
transformation into practical public policies. Public action was considered absolutely
neutral and technocratic. Thus, social capital and legitimacy was always based on the
fact that optimal policies could be developed, using totally objective criteria, in which
neutrality had to be guaranteed by the impartiality of the procedures used in the process.
Critics, and their evidence, opposed to the traditional view have generated new propos-
als to incorporate participation into models in order to explain the public policy-making
process. From that time, an inclusive approach has prevailed among the social agents and
stakeholders participating in the different levels of decision-making.
The dynamics of the EU’s development have resulted in a multi-tiered institutional
model in which the historical institutional structures of the Member States co-exist and
interact with those that are being created and developed within the EU. Furthermore,
during recent years, the complexity of this structure has reinforced traditional public
policy path-dependences. Fishing and agriculture were the first sectors in which the
responsibility for public policies was transferred from the Member States to the Union,
and they have been regulated at Union level from its earliest stages, essentially in a
top-down style.
The knowledge and the quality of the inputs to develop scientific models and applied
results, are very important issues when it comes to managing resources in a reasonable
way, and this is related to the participation and expertise of scientists and stakeholders.
When the views of stakeholders are introduced into the problem-solving process, the
scientific formulation of the issues can be elaborated with richer inputs but with new
complexities.
In this scenario, in addition to being affected by regulations, stakeholders can also
learn to acquire an interest in joining a cooperative task. Thus, to arrive at healthy
fisheries they need to be properly regulated. Stakeholders and scientists alike must find
the right conditions in which to develop a co-operative dynamic, both in the management
area and that of scientific and technical production. This places attention on both sides
simultaneously, and it produces a more complex management-science framework.
To put this participation into practice a system of regional-scale, decentralised manage-
ment units is operational within the EU. They are known as Regional Advisory Councils
(RACs). The purpose of the RACs is precisely to bring together the separate elements
of management, policy-making, and collaboration in knowledge production into a single
forum, in order to develop a co-management model, at a larger scale than the local level
and closer to the resource than the unique, but distant, European authority. Knowledge will
be a crucial instrument to reaching this destination, and knowledge-based management
probably will be a key source of rational resource exploitation.
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